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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Salt Lake City,

v.

)

Plaintiff and Respondent/ )
)
)

Roger Griffin,

)

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(For Publication)
Case No. 870194-CA

)

Before Judges Garff/ Jackson and Orme (On Law and Motion).

The notice of appeal in the above-captioned case was filed
with this court on May 22# 1987. A docketing statement was
filed on June 16, 1987 stating that the appeal was from Ma
final Order of Conviction of the Circuit Court" and that the
date of the "Judgment or Order sought to be reviewed is the
date of conviction, to-wit: March 23, 19187 by a city jury.

On

June 19/ 1987, this court rejected appellant's docketing
statement/ which did not attach a copy of the judgment or order
being appealed.

Appellant by way of an Amendment to Docketing

Statement provided a copy of the computer docket sheet from the
Fifth Circuit Court "demonstrating that t^he sentencing in this
matter took place on 4/21/87."

The appeal proceeded to

briefing.
This court now has the entire record of proceedings in the
Fifth Circuit Court before it. A review of the record reveals

no judgment or sentencing order signed by the trial court
supporting the computerized docket entry provided by
appellant.

Because no signed judgment or order appears in the

record/ we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of
the appeal due to the absence of a final judgment.

See Sather

v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 1986); Utah State Tax Commission
v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1986).
The appeal is dismissed on the basis that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal.
App. 10(e).

R. Utah Ct.

No costs are awarded.

DATED this

day of January, 1988,

FOR THE COURT:

Regnal W. Garff, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PRqCEEDINGS
AND APPELLATE AUTHORITY
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a
jury trial in the Fifth Circuit Court for Salt Lake City,
the Honorable Robert Gibson, Judge, presiding, on the
charges of destruction of property and disturbing the peace.
Authority for this appeal is provided in Section 78-2a-3,
Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether defendant Griffin established that his

Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial was
violated by lack of minorities on the jury venire?
2o

Whether counsel for defendant/appellant Griffin

violated Rule 11, of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by
filing a brief not well grounded in fact and directly
contrary to existing law?
GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT SIX
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . .."
RULE 11, U.R.C.P.
• . . The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extensionk

modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Defendant Griffin was charged by information with
violating Section 32-3-4, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, for unlawfully destroying property of Salt Lake City
Corporation by damaging doors at the City's Water
Department•

(Record on Appeal p. 1. )

Prior to swearing a jury the defendant's counsel raised
an objection to exclusion of minorities from the venire
2
which was overruled.

(Calendar-log sheet, R. 40.)

At the conclusion of trial the jury returned a verdict
of guilty on the destruction of property charge and on a
charge of disturbing the peace in violation of Section 32-111, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City.

(R. 34 & 35.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
of Utah have both unequivocally and recently held that the
Defendant Griffin's brief fails to comply with Rule 24 of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals by not citing at all
to the record.
2
Of course since defendant Griffin did not designate a copy
of the transcript it is impossible to tell from the record
whether or not the jury contained any minority members at
all. Matters outside the record should not be considered on
appeal. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Salt Lake
City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984).

constitutional rights of defendants are not violated merely
by the lack of any minority members on a jury venire.
Rather, both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have required proof of invidious exclusion
before any constitutional challenge can be raised.
The case law is so unequivocal that defendantfs brief
constitutes a violation of Rule 11 in that it could not have
been filed in good faith.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT GRIFFIN FAILED TO MEET THE
BURDEN REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS
TRIAL WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.
The United States Supreme Court has twice set out the
standard for determining whether a particular group? s
absence on a jury venire denies a criminal defendant his
Sixth Amendment rights.

In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.

522, 538, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 95 S.Ct. 692 (1975) the United
States Supreme Court held that:
[P]etit juries must be drawn from a source
fairly representative of the community . . .
[J]ury wheels, pools of names, panels, or
venires from which juries are drawn must not
systematically exclude distinctive groups in
the community and thereby fail to be
reasonably representative thereof.
The Court in Taylor further explained that this
requirement of a fair pool does not mean "that petit juries
actually chosen must mirror the community,"
at 538.

Taylor, supra

In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 58 L.Ed.2d
579, 99 S.Ct. 664 (1979) the United States Supreme Court
explicitly set out a three part test to determine whether or
not a particular venire selection process violated the
defendant's constitutional rights:
In order to establish a prima facie violation
of the fair-cross-section requirement, the
defendant must show (1) that the group
alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive"
group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury selection
process.
With respect to the three-prong Duren test it is clear
that defendant Griffin has totally failed to meet his burden
in this case.

With respect to the first two prongs of a

distinctive group's underrepresentation there is simply no
evidence before this Court to establish that the two tests
have been met.

With respect to the third prong regarding

exclusion, there is not even a claim in defendant Griffin's
brief that minorities were systematically excluded.
Instead, defendant Griffin relies on a totally
unsubstantiated allegation implying that since no minorities
were on the panel they must have been excluded.

While this

enthymeme may make logical sense to defendant's counsel it
certainly does not meet the Duren requirement and is totally
unsupported by the virtually non-existent record before this
Court.

The Duren and Taylor tests have been explicitly
accepted by the Utah Supreme Court.

In State v. Bankhead,

727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) the Utah Supreme Court held:
In any event, the sixth amendment insures
only that a particular segment of the
community will not be systematically excluded
from the jury venire. Juries actually chosen
need not "mirror the community and reflect
the various distinctive groups in the
population." (Emphasis added, citations
omitted)•
The clear language of Bankhead, Duren and Taylor is not
weakened in any way by the recent Utah Supreme Court Minute
Entry in State v. Malin, Utah Supreme Court No. 86-0571
(Minute Entry April 30, 1987).

All that the minute entry in

Malin does is to use the Courtf s rule-making power to
provide for a new, additional source of names for jury
venires.

There is no suggestion in the MaljLn Minute Entry

that the Supreme Court intended to rule that all panels not
chosen from a driver's license list or which fail to contain
a minority, violate the Sixth Amendment.
is patently absurd.

Such a suggestion

The Minute Entry is simply a

prospective change with no intended or actual retroactive
due process implication.
Given the absolute total lack of record before this
Court and the "quality" of the argument in defendant
Griffin's brief it is impossible for this Court to find that
defendant Griffin's trial in any way violated his
constitutional rights.

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL VIOLATED RULE 11 IN
FILING A BRIEF WHICH HAS ABSOLUTELY NO
GOOD FAITH CHANCE OF PREVAILING.
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah have ruled on the responsibility
of criminal defense counsel for filing appellate briefs in
cases where they know the appeal is "wholly frivolous".

The

standard procedure is set out in Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967) which was
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clayton, 639
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).

In essence both of these cases

preclude defense counsel from filing "wholly frivolous"
appeals with certain restrictions to protect the client.
The Anders/Clayton procedures are not followed by
defendant Griffin's counsel in this case.

In light of the

clear, unequivocal and recent case law on this subject
provided by Taylor, Duren and Bankhead, cited in Point I
above it is simply not conceivable that defendant's counsel
can be filing this brief in good faith as required by Rule
3
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the City
is entitled to sanctions, in an amount to be determined by
the Court, against defendant's counsel personally for the
time and expense involved in responding to defendantfs
brief.
3
Defendant Griffin's brief also fails to comply with Rule
24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals as noted in
footnote 1, supra.

CONCLUSION
Defendant Griffin's appeal is directly contrary to
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah and must be dismissed.
Further, the brief is in such bad faith that defendant's
counsel should be personally sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this^Z °l'

day of

iNuveuiDer, ± y o / .

Attorney for Respondent
BRB:cc

